Every benchmark article in this category has the same problem: the numbers are either self-reported by the vendor's happiest customers, or they are an average across industries so broad that no real product sits near it.
We are in an unusual position to fix that. The portfolio these numbers come from runs fifteen products through one Ripples account, so we can read all of them at once, and we sell nothing that depends on any of them looking good. What follows is thirty days, 11 August to 9 September 2026, unedited.
The table
Eight products with enough history to be worth reading. Every figure is as the dashboard reports it.
| Product | Visitors | Active | Signups | Signup CVR | Revenue |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| apptail.io | 25,823 | 35 | 25 | 0.1% | $8.49 |
| CarScope | 4,833 | 1,508 | 305 | 6.3% | $328.45 |
| MailRook | 3,947 | 283 | 109 | 2.8% | $0.00 |
| Hallouminati | 1,008 | 2,429 | 404 | 40.1% | $1,324.72 |
| HypeAgent | 932 | 699 | 458 | 49.1% | $278.00 |
| CastHR | 520 | 543 | 40 | 7.7% | $308.84 |
| Yasha | 171 | 325 | 106 | 62.0% | $0.57 |
| GreekBrain | 89 | 109 | 22 | 24.7% | $83.67 |
| Total | 37,323 | 5,931 | 1,469 | 3.9% | $2,332.74 |
Visitors are first-time visitors. Active counts people we can name or who did product work, so it includes users acquired before this window and excludes anonymous marketing traffic. Signup CVR is signups divided by visitors in the same period.
The first thing to notice is that the total is useless
Blended signup conversion across the portfolio is 3.9%. Not one of the eight products is anywhere near 3.9%. The closest is MailRook at 2.8%, and the spread runs from 0.1% to 62.0%, a factor of 620.
This is what is wrong with every conversion benchmark you have read. "The average SaaS converts at 3%" is arithmetically true here and describes nothing. If you compared yourself to it you would conclude that apptail.io is catastrophically broken and Yasha is the best-converting product ever built, and both readings would be wrong.
Why the spread is that wide
It is not funnel design. Three of these products share a signup form.
apptail.io at 0.1% has 25,823 visitors and 35 active people. It is a public app-intelligence site: most of its pages are store listings that rank in Google, and the overwhelming majority of arrivals are looking up one app and leaving. The traffic is real and the intent is not commercial. A 0.1% signup rate on that population is not a broken funnel, it is a correctly working content site with a product attached to the side.
Yasha at 62.0% has 171 visitors and 106 signups. Almost nobody arrives who was not sent, so the denominator contains hardly any browsing. High conversion rates are usually a small, pre-qualified denominator rather than a good funnel, and this is what that looks like from the inside.
Hallouminati at 40.1% is the interesting one, because it has both: 1,008 visitors and 404 signups, at scale, from organic search. That is a product where the search query and the product are the same thing. Somebody looking for Cyprus citizenship exam practice arrives already wanting the thing.
The rule underneath all three: your conversion rate is mostly a property of who arrives, and only slightly a property of what they find. Which means a conversion rate compared against anyone else's is close to meaningless, and a conversion rate compared against your own last month, per channel, is the only version worth acting on.
Visitors and active disagree, on purpose
Look at the two columns together and four products invert.
apptail.io has 25,823 visitors and 35 active. Hallouminati has 1,008 visitors and 2,429 active. Yasha has 171 visitors and 325 active. CastHR has 520 and 543.
Where active exceeds visitors, the product is being used by people acquired before this month, which is the shape of a product with retention. Where visitors dwarf active, you are looking at reach without a product relationship. apptail.io has 738 times more visitors than active users; Hallouminati has 0.4 times.
If you track one number, the honest answer is that neither of these is it. Visitors is the number that goes in a screenshot and active is the number that pays rent.
The revenue column is the uncomfortable one
Eight products, thirty days, $2,332.74.
That is the part these articles normally leave out, and leaving it out is why the genre is worthless. Two of the eight made under a dollar. One made nothing at all. The largest, Hallouminati at $1,324.72, is 57% of the total on 2.7% of the visitors.
There is a much larger product in this portfolio that we excluded from the table: it did 658,558 visitors and $1,070,110 in the same thirty days. Including it would have made the portfolio look like a $1M-a-month operation and made every other row a rounding error. That is exactly the trick a vendor benchmark plays, and we would rather show you the eight small ones, because the eight small ones are what a portfolio of indie products actually is.
Revenue per visitor across the eight is $0.0625. Six cents. If you are buying traffic at anything above that, the arithmetic has to come from retention and expansion, not from the first month, which is the whole argument for measuring payback rather than ROAS.
What we would want you to take from this
- Stop comparing to benchmarks. A range of 0.1% to 62% inside one portfolio, run by the same people with the same tooling, means the cross-company number cannot be informative about you.
- Read conversion per channel, never blended. The blended rate is a weighted average of populations with nothing in common. Ours moves by a factor of 620 depending on which product's traffic mix you look at.
- Watch visitors against active. The direction of that inequality tells you whether you have a product or an audience, and they need completely different work.
- Distrust any published number that has no zero in it. Real portfolios have products that made $0.57 this month.
Why we can publish this and the comparison sites cannot
Every "best analytics tools" list in this category is funded by affiliate commissions, which is why they rank the highest-paying tool first and why none of them will ever show you a table with a $0.00 in it.
We take no commissions, we have no affiliate programme, and we publish the list of things we refuse to do. The cost of that position is that we cannot buy our way onto those lists. The benefit is that we can print our own portfolio's real numbers, including the bad rows, and nothing depends on you reading them a particular way.
For completeness, the property these numbers were pulled with is itself in the portfolio, and over the same thirty days it recorded 214 visitors, 0 signups and $0.00 in revenue. We left it out of the table because eight products is the sample and a ninth row of zeroes adds nothing, but it would be dishonest to write about publishing bad rows and quietly omit our own.
All figures are from one Ripples account, 11 August to 9 September 2026, in USD. If you want to read your own numbers this way, it is free until $1K MRR.